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ABSTRACT
Because terrorist organizations often operate in network forms where individual terrorists collaborate with each other to carry
out attacks, we could gain valuable knowledge about the terrorist organizations by studying structural properties of such
terrorist networks. However, previous studies of terrorist network structure have generated little actionable results. This is
due to the difficulty in collecting and accessing reliable data and the lack of advanced network analysis methodologies in the
field. To address these problems, we introduced the Web structural mining technique into the terrorist network analysis field
which, to the best our knowledge, has never been done before. We employed the proposed technique on a Global Salafi Jihad
network dataset collected through a large scale empirical study. Results from our analysis not only provide insights for
terrorism research community but also support decision making in law-reinforcement, intelligence, and security domains to
make our nation safer.
Keywords
Terrorism, social network analysis, web structural mining, visualization.
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism threats span personal, organizational, and societal levels and have far-reaching economic, psychological, political,
and social consequences. Only with a thorough understanding of how the terrorist organizations function can we defend
against these threats. Previous studies showed that terrorist organizations often operate in network forms where individual
terrorists collaborate with each other to carry out attacks (Krebs, 2001). Thus, we could gain valuable knowledge about the
terrorist organizations by studying various structural properties of terrorist networks. Such knowledge may help authorities
develop efficient and effective disruptive strategies and measures.
Terrorism-related research domain has experienced tremendous growth since September 11th; however, studies of terrorist
networks have generated little actionable results. This is mainly due to the difficulty in collecting and accessing reliable data
and the lack of advanced network analysis methodologies in this field. To address these problems, we report in this paper a
case study of the analysis of the structure of a very large global terrorist network, the Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) network using
methods and techniques from several relevant areas such as Web structural mining and social network analysis. We consider
our case study unique and beneficial from three different perspectives. First, unlike most previous studies which used
unreliable data sources such as news stories and media-generated incident databases, our study was based on reliable data
collected in a large-scale in-depth empirical study on the GSJ network (Sageman, 2004). Second, our study introduced
multiple advanced network analysis methodologies into the study of terrorist networks including the Web structural mining
techniques which, to the best our knowledge, has never been used in this domain. Third, our results not only provide insights
for terrorism research community but also support the decision-making within law-reinforcement, intelligence, and security
domains to make our nation safer.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews various network analysis studies in different domains
in relation to terrorist network analysis. In section 3, we provide some background information on the GSJ network and
briefly describe how the GSJ network dataset was collected through the empirical study.  In section 4, we present our
methodologies and report our findings from the analysis. Section 5 concludes this paper with implications and future
directions.
RELATED WORKS
In this section, we review a few network analysis methodologies widely employed in other domains: social network analysis
and Web link structure analysis. These techniques can be used to analyze terrorist networks. Different techniques reveal
different perspectives of terrorist networks.
Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis (SNA) is used in sociology research to analyze patterns of relationships and interactions between
social actors in order to discover an underlying social structure (Scott, 1991, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A number
of quantitative SNA methods have been employed to study organizational behavior, inter-organizational relations, citation
analysis, computer mediated communication, and many other domains (Galaskiewicz and Krohn, 1984; Garton,
Haythornthwaite and Wellman, 1999; Kleinberg, 1998). SNA has recently been recognized as a promising technology for
studying criminal organizations and enterprises (McAndrew, 1999; Sparrow, 1991). Studies involving evidence mapping in
fraud and conspiracy cases have recently been added to this list (Baker and Faulkner, 1993; Saether and Canter, 2001).
In SNA studies, a network is usually represented as a graph, which contains a number of nodes (network members)
connected by links (relationships). SNA can be used to identify key members and interaction pattern between sub-groups in
terrorist networks. Several centrality measures can be used to identify key members who play important roles in a network.
Freeman (Freeman, 1979) provided definitions of the three most popular centrality measures: degree, betweenness, and
closeness.
Degree measures how active a particular node is. It is defined as the number of direct links a node a has:
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where n is the total number of nodes in a network, c(i, a) is a binary variable indicating whether a link exists between nodes i
and a. A network member with a high degree could be the leader or “hub” in a network.
Betweenness measures the extent to which a particular node lies between other nodes in a network. The betweenness of a
node a is defined as the number of geodesics (shortest paths between two nodes) passing through it:
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where )(ag ij indicates whether the shortest path between two other nodes i and j passes through node a. A member with high
betweenness may act as a gatekeeper or “broker” in a network for smooth communication or flow of goods (e.g., drugs).
Closeness is the sum of the length of geodesics between a particular node a and all the other nodes in a network. It actually
measures how far away one node is from other nodes and sometimes is called “farness” (Baker and Faulkner, 1993; Freeman,
1979, 2000):
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where ),( ail is the length of the shortest path connecting nodes i and a.
Web Structural Analysis
The Web is one of the largest and most complicated networks in the world. The Web, as a network of Web pages connected
by hyperlinks, bears some similarities with social networks because previous studies have shown that the link structure of the
Web represents a considerable amount of latent human annotation (Gibson, Kleinberg and Raghavan, 1998). For example,
when there is a direct link from page A to page B, it often means that the author of page A recommends page B because of its
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relevant contents. Moreover, similarly to citation analysis in which frequently cited articles are considered to be more
important, Web pages with more incoming links are often considered to be better than those with fewer incoming links. Co-
citation is another concept borrowed from the citation analysis field that has been used in link-based analysis algorithms.
Web pages are co-cited when they are linked to by the same set of parent Web pages and heavily co-cited pages are often
relevant to the same topic. Co-citation is particularly helpful in finding relevant pages in some domains where pages with
similar contents avoid linking to each other (e.g., commercial domains where providers of similar online contents are
competitors). Researchers have developed many algorithms to judge the importance and quality of Web pages using the
criteria mentioned above. PageRank is one of the most popular algorithms.
The PageRank algorithm is computed by weighting each incoming-link to a page proportionally to the quality of the page
containing that incoming-link (Cho, Garcia-Molina and Page, 1998). The quality of these referring pages is also determined
by PageRank. Thus, the PageRank of a page p is calculated recursively as follows:
PageRank(p) = å´+-
p tolinksqall )(
)(1
qc
qPageRankdd
where d is a damping factor between 0 and 1 and c(q) is the number of out-going links in q.
PageRank is originally designed to calculate the importance of Web pages based on the Web link structure and is used in the
commercial search engine Google (Brin and Page, 1998) to rank the search results. However, it can also be used to determine
the importance of social actors in a proper social network where links imply similar “recommendation” or “endorsement”
relationships as the hyperlinks in Web graph. In a co-authorship network, a link between authors implies the mutual
endorsement relationship between them and the PageRank algorithm can be used to rank the authors based their importance
in this co-authorship network. In the co-authorship analysis study conducted by Liu et al. (2004), PageRank was used as one
of the author ranking criteria along with other traditional SNA centrality measures. Similarly, we believe that PageRank can
also used to rank the importance of terrorists within a properly constructed terrorist network.
GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD NETWORK
The Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) is part of a violent worldwide terrorism movement. It is a new form of terrorism which
threatens the worlds in different and horrifying ways from previous forms of this scourge. It mainly targets the West, but its
reckless operations and indiscriminately slaughter masses of humanity of all races and religions. With Al Qaeda as its
vanguard, the GSJ includes many terrorist groups with members from different countries and forms a large global terrorist
network. Through this network, the GSJ have successfully planned and launched many large-scale attacks against civilians
across different countries. Examples include the 9/11 tragedy in 2001, the bombing in Bali in 2002, and the bombing in
Morocco in 2003.
Collecting data on the GSJ terrorist presents many challenges, mostly because of a general lack of information. The GSJ data
we used in this study was collected through a long-term empirical study on the GSJ members. The sources of information we
used to collect data from were all in the public domain. The information was often inconsistent. We considered the source of
information in selection facts to include in the dataset. In decreasing degrees of reliability, the information sources we
favored include transcripts of court proceedings involving GSJ terrorists and their organizations; followed by reports of court
proceedings; then corroborated information from people with direct access to the information provided; uncorroborated
statements from people with the access; and finally statements from people who had heard the information secondhand. Data
collected from these multiple sources were cross-validated to ensure maximum accuracy.
The final dataset consists of the profile information of 366 GSJ terrorists roughly divided into 4 clumps based on their
geographical origins: central member, core Arab, maghreb Arab, and Southeast Asian. The central member clump mainly
consists of the key Al Qaeda members. They take the leading position in the whole GSJ network. The core Arab clump
consists of GSJ terrorists from core Arabic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The maghreb Arab clump consists of
GSJ terrorists  from North  African  countries  such as  Morocco and Algeria.   Finally,  the  Southeast  Asian  clump consists  of
terrorists from Jemaah Islamiyah centered in Indonesia and Malaysia.
The data collected for each of the 366 terrorists includes a set of sociological features (e.g., geographical origins, original
socio-economic status, education, occupation, etc) and individual psychological (e.g., mental illness, personality, pathological
narcissism, etc) features that could be the explanations of why these people became terrorists. More importantly, the data also
captures all known relationships and interactions between these 366 GSJ terrorists. These relationships and interactions
include personal relationships (e.g., acquaintance, friend, relative, and family member), religious relationships (following the
same religious leader), operational interactions (participating in the same attacks), and other relationships. The dataset is
presented in a form a spreadsheet with each raw containing the basic features of a certain GSJ member as well as all the other
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members that are related to this member through the various relationships or interactions mentioned above. We then
calculated the “distance” between each pair of terrorists in the network based on the number of relationships between them
and visualized the network using multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique. Our visualization provides an intuitive and
clear view of the overall GSJ network (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Visualization of the Full GSJ Network
Figure 1 is the visualization of the GSJ network with all types of relations. Each node represents a terrorist. A link represents
a social relation. The four terrorist clumps are color-coded: red for central member clump, yellow for core Arab clump, blue
for Maghreb Arab, and green for Southeast Asian clump.
NETWORK ANALYSIS ON THE GSJ DATASET
To better understand how the GSJ network works, we employed the proposed Web structural mining approach and the
traditional SAN techniques on the GSJ network dataset. In this section, we describe our analysis procedures and report our
findings.
Web Structural Mining Approach
Our assumption in applying the Web structural mining approach is that, in a social network, not all the members play equal
roles. Instead, some members may have stronger social influences or higher social status than the others. In a terrorist
network context, a terrorist may act as a leading role and pass directions and orders to a group of terrorists who have lower
status than him and at the same time he is also receiving directions and orders from someone who has higher status. Such
unequalized social relationships between the terrorists may hold special interest for experts to study the terrorist organization
behavior. To study the different social status and relationships in a terrorist network context, we borrowed the link analysis
methodology from the Web structural mining area and applied it on our GSJ network data.
The core link algorithm we employed was the PageRank algorithm because it was used in previous studies to calculate the
“importance” of authors within an authorship network. The link analysis we conducted on the GSJ network is described as
follows.
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First, we used the PageRank algorithm reviewed in section 2 to calculate a “social importance” score for each of the terrorists
in the network. In this process, the PageRank algorithm will rank a terrorist higher if 1) he links to more other members in the
network and 2) he links to other members with high importance scores in the network. Similarly to the degree measure, high
importance scores given by the PageRank algorithm are also indications of leading roles in the terrorist network. However,
PageRank algorithm determines the importance of a specific member based on the structure of the whole network; while
degree measure make the some judgment only based on very limited, local structural information.
After the importance scores for all the members in the GSJ network were calculated, for each member in the network, the
neighboring member with the highest important scores was identified. The assumption here is that the most important
neighboring member for a terrorist may well be the local leader that the terrorist directly report to. We then draw a directional
link from each of the terrorists to their local leaders to visualize the terrorist social hierarchy and this graph is called a
Authority Derivation Graph (ADG) (Toyoda and Kitsuregawa, 2001). Figure 2 shows the ADG of the GSJ network.
Figure 2. The Authority Derivation Graph of the GSJ Network
In the ADG, each node represents a terrorist in the GSJ network. A link pointing from terrorist A to terrorist B means that B
has the highest rank among all members who have direct relationships with A and it is likely that, in their interaction, B acts
as the role of “leader” and A acts as the role of “follower.” The color of a node indicates which clump the member belongs to
and the shape of a node indicates how many attacks the member has been involved in. The thickness of the links between
nodes indicates the type of relationship between the members. A thick link means there are personal relationships (kinship,
family, friends, acquaintance, etc) between two members while a thin link means there are only operational relationships
(involved in the same attack) between two members.
The ADG of the GSJ terrorist network contains a large central component and several small and relatively autonomous
components. 2. The central component, consisting of key Al Qaeda members, has a more traditional hierarchy or
“corporate structure”. We can clearly see that bin Laden has the highest status or, in other words, he is the leader of the whole
GSJ network. Several major Lieutenants serve as the first level underlings and the middle-person between bin Laden and key
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members of the other 3 clumps. More specifically, Hambali is the middle-person between bin Laden and the Southeast Asian
clump; Zubaydah serves as the middle-person between bin Laden and the Maghreb Arab clump; Zawahiri connects bin Laden
to the remainder of the Central member clump; and KSM acts as the middle-person between bin Laden and the core Arab
clump.
Except for the central component, the other components in the ADG have smaller size and shorter average shortest paths.
This overall structure of the ADG suggests that the GSJ network may functions a “holding company” model, with Al Qaeda
as the “umbrella organization” in charge of planning and many small independent groups as “operating divisions”. Such a
model allows effective planning of attacks by having Al Qaeda as the “master brain” of the whole network and reduces the
risk of being disrupted by leaving the operations to the smaller groups that have minimum interactions with the central
members.
Another interesting observation we made from the ADG is the difference in the link types between different types of
members in the network. We found that 65% of the links between the leaders (members with incoming links) are personal
links  (acquaintances,  friends,  relatives,  and  family  members),  while  only  38%  of  the  links  between  the  leaders  and  the
followers (members with no in-coming links) are personal links. Such differences in the link types between different
members were also demonstrated in some other illegal networks such as drug dealer networks. The high percentage of
personal relationships between the leaders forms the trustworthy “backbone” of the GSJ network and the low percentage of
personal relationships between other members and the core members helps keep the network decentralized, covert, and less
vulnerable.
Social Network Analysis Approach
For comparison purposes, we also conducted traditional centrality analysis on the GSJ dataset to identify the key members
within the network.
For each terrorist, three centrality measures were calculated: degree, betweenness, and closeness. Degree measure was used
to identify the leaders of each clump in the GSJ network. High degrees indicate high levels of activity and wide social
influence, which means the members with high degrees are likely to be the leaders of their local networks. Gatekeepers,
members with high betweenness, hold special interest for terrorist experts because gatekeepers are usually the contact person
between several terrorist groups and play important roles in coordinating terrorist attacks. The closeness measure was used
differently from the previous two centrality measures. Instead of terrorists with high closeness, we identified those with low
closeness whom are usually called outliers in SNA literatures. Outliers are of special interest because previous literature
showed that, in illegal networks, outliers could be the true leaders. They appear to be outliers because they often direct the
whole network from behind the scene, which prevents authorities from getting enough intelligence on them. Table 1
summarizes the top 5 terrorists ranked by the 3 centrality measures in each of the 4 clumps.
Ranking Leader (Degree) Gatekeeper (Betweenness) Outlier (Closeness)
Central Member
1 Zawahiri bin Laden Khalifah
2 Makkawi Zawahiri SbinLaden
3 Islambuli Khadr Ghayth
4 bin Laden Sirri M Atef
5 Attar Zubaydah Sheikh Omar
Core Arab
1 Khallad Harithi Elbaneh
2 Shibh Nashiri Khadr4
3 Jarrah Khallad Janjalani
4 Atta Johani Dahab
5 Mihdhar ZaMihd Mehdi
Southeast Asian
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1 Hambali Baasyir Siliwangi
2 Baasyir Hambali Fathi
3 Mukhlas Gungun Naharudin
4 Iqbal Muhajir Yunos2
5 Azahari Setiono Maidin
Maghreb Arab
1 Doha Yarkas Mujati
2 Benyaich2 Zaoui Parlin
3 Fateh Chaib Mahdjoub
4 Chaib DavidC Zinedine
5 Benyaich1 Maaroufi Ziyad
Table 1. Terrorists with Top Centrality Ranks within Each Clump
After showing our ADG and SNA results to the domain experts, we confirmed that the overall structure of the ADG and key
members identified by the centrality measures matched the experts’ knowledge on the terrorism organization. Members with
high degree measures are also known by the experts as the leaders of the clumps in real world. Also such members would
appear to be the “hubs” in the ADG analysis results. For example, Osama bin Laden, the leader of the central member clump,
had 72 links to other terrorists and ranked the second in degree and he appears to be the center member in the ADG of the
whole GSJ network. Moreover, the experts mentioned that each clump has a Lieutenant who acts as an important connector
between the clumps. For example, Zawahiri, Lieutenant of the central member clump, connects the central member clump
and the core Arab clump together. Hambali, Lieutenant of the Southeast Asian clump, connects the Southeast Asian clump
and the central member clump. These Lieutenants were also correctly identified by the SNA analysis for their high
betweenness. Moreover, these Lieutenants appear to be the branch nodes on the ADG which connects the root nodes (leaders)
and the leaf nodes (low-level members).
CONCLUSION
It is very important for us to understand the functions and structures of terrorist networks to win the battle against terror. In
this study, we employed several advanced network analysis techniques on a GSJ network dataset collected through a large
scale empirical study. We applied Web structural mining methodologies in the GSJ network analysis. This approach, to the
best of our knowledge, has never been used in this domain before and it helps us study the terrorist organization structure
under a social hierarchy assumption. This may provide insights into better understanding of terrorist organization behavior.
We also applied traditional SNA analysis on the GSJ dataset. Domain experts confirmed that both our Web structural mining
results and the SNA results matched their on knowledge and the Web structural mining analysis provides new insights to the
terrorist network analysis domain.
We have several future research directions to pursue. First, we are working with terrorism experts to fine tuning our
algorithms to generate more accurate results. Second, we plan to extend the scope of our project to other types of illegal
networks such as crime networks. Third, we want to add time-series analysis to get a more comprehensive understanding of
the evolution and dynamics of terrorism networks (Sageman, 2004).
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